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ๆฌกใฎๆ็ซ ใฏ,ๆฅๆฌๆใซใใฃใใๆณใใจใ้ๅพณใใซ้ขใใใใฎใงใใ ่ชญใใ ใใใง่จญๅใซ็ญใ
ใชใใใ
When we think about the reach of the law, the first question is whether we have good
reason to accept that the law has any proper authority | (ใข)|all. (A) Why should we
obey it? To a certain extent, the answer is implicit in the analysis of the โnature of law"
question. (B) If law is held to be morally authoritative by definition, it will seem that an
obligation to obey flows simply from the recognition of law as law. If the definition of law
excludes this moral authority, the source of obligation must be sought elsewhere. The
question about authority, however, is not as straightforward as this. What we are asking
about is the kind of connection to be found
(ใค)| the authority of rulers to lay down
laws and the legal and moral duty of the ruled to obey them. It is often asserted that
there seems to be a general duty of obligation to obey the law. What (c) this means is
that in the absence of special reasons which might justify a specific exemption, the
acceptance of the duty of obedience presupposes the acknowledgement of the law's
authority. (D) How it might lead to this, however, is a matter for debate. It may be for
reasons quite independent
(ใฆ)| the authoritative status of the law. The special
reasons for suspending this presumption, furthermore, suggesting that there are limits
to the general duty, must arise from considerations powerful enough to take priority
over the standard reasons for obedience.
ใ่จญๅใ
(ใฆ)
ใใค้ธใณใชใใใ
I.
(ใข)
ใซๅ
ฅใๆใ้ฉๅฝใช่ชใ, (a)~ (f)ใฎไธญใใใใใใ1ใค
(ใค)
(ใข)= (
ใธ
(ใค=(
(ใฆ)= (
ใธ
(a) of
(b) on
(c) of
(d)from
(e) at
(f) between
I. ไธ็ท้จ(C)ใฎๅ
ๅฎนใๆฅๆฌ่ชใง็ฐกๆฝใซ่ชฌๆใใชใใใ
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